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Abstract  
In this article, we take a novel approach to analysing English sentencing remarks in 
cases of women who kill. We apply computational, quantitative, and qualitative 
methods from corpus linguistics to analyse recurrent patterns in a col- lection of 
English Crown Court sentencing remarks from 2012 to 2015, where a female 
defendant was convicted of a homicide offence. We detail the ways in which women 
who kill are referred to by judges in the sentencing remarks, providing frequency 
information on pronominal, nominative, and categorising naming strategies. In 
discussion of the various patterns of preference both across and within these  
categories  (e.g.  pronoun  vs.  nomination,   title vs. surname   vs.   fore-   name ? 
surname), we remark upon the identities constructed through the references provided. 
In so doing, we: (1) quantify the extent to which members of the judiciary invoke 
patriarchal values and gender stereotypes within their sentencing remarks to construct 
female defendants, and (2) identify particular identities and narratives that emerge 
within sentencing remarks for women who kill. We find that judges refer to women 
who kill in a number of ways that systematically create dichotomous nar- ratives of 
degraded victims or dehumanised monsters. We also identify marked absences in 
naming strategies, notably: physical identification normally associated with 
narrativization of women’s experiences; and the first person pronoun, reflecting 
omissions of women’s own voices and narratives of their lived experiences in the 
courtroom. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Statistically, women consistently make up a small minority of homicide offenders in 
England and Wales. Their low share of recorded involvement in homicides has 
historically resulted in women being excluded from scholarly consideration of this 
form of violent crime. However, a growing body of scholarship, particularly legal 
and criminological, has engaged with the experiences of women who kill (WWK) 
and their interactions with legal and criminal justice institutions (see, for example, 
[36, 50, 53, 54]). 
In this work, we add to the growing body of literature around WWK through 
tracing ideological positioning of the court by detailing the language of relatively 
powerful social actors (judges) as they discursively construct the identities of 
relatively powerless social actors (WWK) in legal documents (sentencing remarks). 
Though law is language and sentencing remarks are performative in nature, 
application of linguistic frameworks for social actor analysis in sentencing remarks 
is quite rare. Indeed, within the existing body of research on WWK, corpus 
linguistic methodologies (which provide both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to analysis) have not yet been employed. This article is thus the 
production of an innovative methodological approach at the intersection between 
law, gender, and linguistics, drawing upon both qualitative and quantitative methods 
of analysis. 
The research involves analyses of cases involving WWK in a custom-collected 
corpus of English Crown Court sentencing remarks, 2012–2015, where a female 
defendant was convicted of a homicide offence. We have chosen to specifically 
focus on cases involving WWK due to their relative rarity and the perceived 
deviance of these women in relation to understandings of appropriate femininity 
[53, 54]. By focusing specifically on WWK—rather than taking, for example, a 
comparative approach involving cases of men who kill—we have been able to 
explore the judicial narratives surrounding these women, qua women. This, in turn, 
has allowed depth of understanding in relation to legal-discursive constructions of 
WWK which can help to develop understandings of the relationship between law 
and gender, particularly femininity. Thus, when analysing sentencing remarks, it is 
not the sentences themselves that we are interested in, but rather the naming 
strategies utilised to the end of (consciously or unconsciously) constructing 
identities by the judiciary. As such, in this article, we will be identifying and 
quantifying the ways in which judges invoke particular stereotypes and identities to 
position female defendants in gendered terms, while discussing specific supporting 
narratives  that   emerge   within   the  sentencing  remarks.  We   will  conclude  by 
  
 
 
 
exploring the implications of our analysis for future research, and for women who 
come into contact with the criminal justice   system. 
 
1.1 Overview of Previous Legal Theory and   Research 
 
There exists an extensive, and growing, body of literature surrounding the treatment 
of women within the criminal justice system as perpetrators of crime. Several 
seminal studies, including those by Allen [1], Worrall [55], and Edwards [17, 18], 
have highlighted the gendered response experienced by offending women when  
they engage with the criminal law and justice system. It has been argued that whilst 
the criminal law portrays itself as gender neutral (most notably through the so-called 
‘reasonable person’ standard), the reality is that both the criminal law and justice 
system continues to be gendered masculine [9, 28]. Consequently, ‘‘female  
defendants are processed within the criminal justice system in accordance with the 
crimes which they committed and the extent to which the commission of the act and 
its nature deviates from appropriate feminine behaviour’’ [17: 213]. So-called 
‘appropriate femininity’ is based on patriarchal understandings of what it is, and 
should be, to be a woman. For example, the notions that women are non-violent, 
passive, controlled by their hormones and emotions, and primarily understood in 
relation to their relationships with others, especially as wives and mothers (see, for 
example: [38, 54]). 
Research has highlighted how these stereotypes around appropriate femininity 
have ramifications for the discursive constructions of WWK within socio-legal 
discourse. Indeed, the four broadly constructed socio-legal narratives that emerge in 
cases of WWK are those of the ‘mad’, ‘sad’, or ‘bad’ woman, or the woman as 
‘victim’ [36, 50, 53, 54]. The particular narrative which emerges in individual cases 
of homicidal women depends on the extent to which these women are viewed as 
adhering to understandings of appropriate femininity (in the case of WWK as ‘mad’, 
‘sad’, or ‘victims’), or deviating from it (in the case of ‘bad’ women). As Worrall 
[55: 35] argues, ‘‘the female lawbreaker is offered the opportunity to neutralise the 
effects of her law-breaking by entering into a contract whereby she permits her life 
to be represented primarily in terms of its domestic, sexual and pathological 
dimensions’’. For those women who enter such a contract, it is the extent to which 
they (and their actions) can be understood in relation to appropriate femininity that 
dictates the discursively constructed narratives that   emerge. 
Very little of the existing research in relation to WWK has been at the legal- 
linguistic interface and none of it has involved the application of corpus linguistic 
methods to such cases. The existing scholarship has largely examined the judicial 
language and discourses within appeal cases, particularly those involving filicidal 
women (see, for example: [54]) and battered WWK their abusive partners (see, for 
example: [10, 37]). This study casts a wider net, taking into account all cases of 
WWK in a given time period, to allow for an interdisciplinary, quantitatively-driven 
methodology. 
  
 
1.2 Theoretical Overview of Linguistic Perspectives and Previous  Research 
 
The absence of quantitative linguistic methodologies, such as corpus linguistic 
methods, in an analysis of the sentencing remarks of WWK is notable, particularly 
when considering that the law is enacted through language and sentencing remarks 
are discursive. Whilst such methods have been applied in other areas of the law, 
much of the focus has been on forensic approaches including authorship analysis 
(see, for instance: [12, 13]), comprehensibility (e.g. [49]), language during 
examination and cross-examination (e.g. [22]) or analysis of the ‘voice’ of 
Tribunals (e.g. [41]). Therefore, this article illustrates some of the latest work being 
undertaken at the legal-linguistic  interface. 
This research is undertaken in the spirit of critical discourse analysis, which holds 
Habermas’s claim that ‘‘language is also a medium of domination and social force. 
It serves to legitimize relations of organized power’’ [19: 259], encode ideology, and 
to ‘other’ the powerless. Here, we are concerned with the relationship between the 
grammatical system of language and the social needs that language serves [20: 142]. 
In the scenario of sentencing remarks, the judge has authorised power, both 
materially and metaphysically; he/she may choose (consciously or unconsciously)  
to foreground specific aspects of the accused’s identity and/or actions in the retelling 
of the events [11, 15]. Sentencing remarks do not exist above or outside of 
sociocultural contextualisation; judges’ language relies upon and incorporates 
ideologies (see, for instance: [24, 31, 40]) and ‘fact’ is framed for narrative 
coherence [27]. One way of tracing elements of narrative and ideological 
underpinnings is analysing the way that social actors are named and referred to. 
Here, we analyse references to WWK, who are relatively powerless in the discursive 
scenario; they are conceptualised and communicated as constituent categories of 
social situations, most often through the agency of others. Particularly in oral 
discourse, references to social actors serve various functions, such as: attracting 
attention; identifying the addressee; and maintaining and reinforcing the relation- 
ship between interlocutors [8, 29, 42]. Below, we detail the methods of searching 
and discussing notable social actor  references. 
 
 
2 Description of Data and  Methods 
 
2.1 Data 
 
The data being analysed consists of a corpus of 48,361 words (tokens) made up of 
17 sentencing remarks from England and Wales between 1st January 2012 and 30th 
November 2015 involving WWK. These were downloaded from the Courts and 
Tribunals Judiciary website [14]. 
It is worth noting that the 17 sentencing remarks which form the basis of our 
study do not reflect the total number of homicide cases involving female defendants 
over this time period. Indeed, statistics from the Office for National Statistics  show 
  
 
 
 
that between April 2012 and March 2015,
1 
90 women were convicted of homicide 
offences [39]. The primary reason for the discrepancy between these figures is 
simply that sentencing remarks are not made publicly available for most cases. 
Those remarks which are published online are usually only those associated with 
high-profile cases that have received substantial media attention, or involve cases 
that give guidance on legal issues [34]. Therefore, one arguable limitation of our 
data-set is its public nature. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that judges are 
potentially influenced by publicity when writing sentencing remarks in high-  
profile cases. The extent to which this occurs is impossible for us to measure. 
However, in many ways, this potential issue marks these sentencing remarks out    
as a particularly important source for analysis. By analysing publicly available 
sentencing remarks, we are examining those remarks that  potentially  have  the 
most impact outside of the courtroom, at least on public discourse, as well as 
recognizing ‘‘judges … [as] the most ‘official’ storytellers in contemporary human 
existence’’ [2: 501]. 
Due to the relative infrequency of female offending and the rarity of publication 
of sentencing remarks, the resulting data set is small by corpus linguistic standards. 
However, the corpus is opportunistic in that it contains all publicly available 
sentencing remarks for women convicted of homicide offences in England and 
Wales from a given time period, and is therefore as representative a sample as might 
conceivably be collected. The corpus reflects an interesting array of cases, 
containing single and multiple offenders, with offenders across a broad age range, 
and heterogeneity in victim profiles, as discussed   below. 
All sentencing remarks within our corpus came from homicide cases involving 
female defendants, either as sole defendants or as co-defendants with one or more 
co-offender. We classified cases involving co-defendants as being those where the 
female killer was tried, convicted, and sentenced alongside her co-offender(s). The 
co-defendants did not need to be found guilty of the same crime, but needed to have 
been involved in the same chain of events in the case. If women had killed alongside 
others, but were not tried, convicted or sentenced at the same time as their co- 
offenders, they were not classified as co-offending cases. Taking this approach, 
most of our cases (11 out of the 17) involved women as co-defendants, all of whom 
offended with male accomplices.
2 
The facts of the cases are very briefly 
summarised in Table 1 below to provide some context for discussions later in the 
paper. At the outset, it is worth noting that the naming strategy we use when 
referring to cases and discussing WWK is surname only. This approach has been 
taken to make identification of the relevant cases as easy as possible by reflecting 
the case names, for example R v   Bonser. 
Only four of the cases within our dataset  (Luczak, Lagwinowicz,  Edwards    and 
Philpott) were heard by female judges. This makes it difficult to consider the extent 
 
1 This is the time period for which data is available and that is closest to the time period we have used to 
collect the sentencing remarks. 
2 It is worth noting that this is a point of interest in and of itself as it prima facie supports some 
suggestions that when women co-offend it is typically with men and that when women commit 
particularly heinous crimes it is also typically as part of a co-offending relationship (see, for example, 
[7]). 
  
 
Table 1   Summary of cases contained in WWK   corpus 
Offender name    Offence(s) Co- 
offender(s) 
 
 
Judge name Word 
count 
 
 
Ahmed, 
Farzana 
Bonser, 
Hannah 
Murder of her daughter Husband Mr Justice 
Evans 
Murder of a girl – Mr Justice 
Cranston 
1950 
 
1776 
Chalk, Donna Murder of homeless man Three men Mr Justice 
Walker 
2121 
Clarence, 
Tania 
Dennehy, 
Joanne 
Edgington, 
Nicola 
Manslaughter by reason of diminished 
responsibility of her three  children 
Murder of three men, and attempted murder 
of two others 
Murder of a woman and the attempted 
murder of another 
– Mr Justice 
Sweeney 
Three men Mr Justice 
Spencer 
– His Honour 
Judge Barker 
QC 
3351 
 
12,140 
 
2644 
Edwards, 
Susan 
Murder of her parents Husband Mrs Justice 
Thirlwall 
2481 
Hoare, Shauna    Manslaughter of male partner’s  step-sister 
and other related offences 
Male 
partner 
Mr Justice 
Dingemans 
3267 
Hutton, 
Amanda 
Gross negligence manslaughter of her son 
and other offences related to maltreatment 
of her children 
Son His Honour 
Judge Thomas 
QX 
3022 
Kunene, 
Virginia 
Gross negligence manslaughter of  her son Husband Mr Justice Singh 2810 
Lagwinowicz, 
Anna 
Murder of her male ex-partner’s current 
girlfriend 
Male ex- 
partner 
and uncle 
Mrs Justice 
Sharp 
2088 
Luczak, 
Magdelena 
Murder of her son Male 
partner 
Mrs Justice Cox 2934 
Munshi, Fiaz Unlawful killing of two children – Mr Justice 
Spencer 
3262 
Osoteku, 
Victoria 
Manslaughter of a boy – His Honour 
Judge 
Christopher 
Moss QC 
1311 
Philpott, 
Mairead 
 
 
Shuttleworth, 
Rebecca 
Manslaughter of six of  her children Husband 
and 
another 
man 
Murder of her son Male 
partner 
Mrs Justice 
Thirlwall 
 
 
Mr Justice 
Spencer 
4236 
 
 
 
4040 
Smith, 
Melanie 
Murder of two adults and  three children – Mr Justice 
Williams 
818 
 
 
  
 
 
 
to which judicial gender impacts upon language choice and naming conventions 
within these sentencing remarks. However, noting the fact that the vast majority of 
the judges are male is relevant for providing context for later analysis. 
 
2.2 Methodologies 
 
2.2.1 Legal Methodology 
 
Underpinning the analysis undertaken in this article is a feminist legal methodology, 
centred around a critical interrogation of legal discourse, and reflecting ‘feminist 
theoretical concerns about the way in which law constructs gender’ [26: 7]. More 
precisely, we are interested in the extent to which gender stereotypes around 
appropriate femininity have influenced judicial narratives in cases of WWK. 
Reinforcing this feminist legal approach, we have made a conscious decision not to 
include analysis of cases of men who kill, nor to undertake substantive comparative 
analysis in those cases where women have co-offended with men. That is not to say 
that such analysis would not be useful in future research. However, we are clear that 
by considering sentencing remarks only in cases of WWK in this article, we are 
taking the feminist position that women, particularly female offenders, should not be 
considered the ‘Other’3 [6: 6] as they often are within legal discourse. Rather than 
‘Othering’ these actors, they are central to our analysis, thus helping us to understand 
the judicial narratives that emerge for these women qua women. Any approach 
incorporating comparisons to men who kill would arguably undermine this approach, 
as well as limiting the depth of analysis that has been produced here. A 
methodological point of note is that we use the terms woman/female interchangeably 
throughout the paper when referring to the WWK. As far as we are aware, these 
women are cisgender
4 
and thus, for the purposes of this paper, we treat them as such. 
 
2.2.2 Corpus Linguistic Methodology 
 
Generally speaking, ‘‘[c]orpus linguistics is not a monolithic, consensually agreed 
set of methods and procedures’’, but is rather a heterogeneous field containing a 
group of methods for studying language [33: 1]. In this paper, we draw upon two 
main methods: frequency and concordance, which exemplify quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, respectively. Generating frequency lists is simply a way of 
determining which words occur in the corpus, and how many occurrences there are 
of each. Concordancing allows a researcher to search a corpus for a specific 
sequence (e.g. a word or a phrase) and output all examples of that sequence into an 
easily-readable format. We provide concordance lines throughout this paper, 
numbered, with search sequences in boldface, additional naming strategies (i.e. of 
other social actors) underlined, and further co-text salient for immediate  discussion 
 
3 This idea of women as ‘‘Other’’ asserts that women are defined in opposition to men, by everything that 
men are not. 
4 That is to say that these women’s gender identities ‘‘correspond’’ with the sex that they were assigned at 
birth. 
  
 
in italics. Remarks and the cases they are drawn from can be identified by the 
surname of the female offender in brackets at the end of any given concordance line. 
To exploit both frequency and concordance data in this work, we have marked-up 
our data to enrich the sentencing remarks with primary pragmatic analysis. Naming 
strategies within the corpus are extremely diverse. For instance, ‘‘Hannah’’, 
‘‘Bonser’’, ‘‘she’’, ‘‘you’’, and ‘‘I’’ could all refer to the same social actor. In any 
given text, pronouns such as ‘‘her’’, ‘‘you’’, and ‘‘me’’ could refer to offenders, 
victims, or judges. To allow for a quantitative view over the language, we have 
incorporated XML mark-up, as recommended by Hardie [21]. Every reference to 
male and female offenders has been manually marked-up, opening up the 
opportunity for search-and-recall on a large number of search terms unrelated at 
the word level but near-synonymous at the pragmatic level. Each reference is 
marked-up for three features: gender, (grammatical) case, and naming convention. In 
this work, we make use of the ‘gender’ and ‘name’ tags5; these are described below. 
Mark-up of naming convention: 
• pro: Assigned for pronoun usage, i.e. I, your,    her 
• giv: Where some combination of title, (reduced) forename, and surname are  
used to refer to a social actor, e.g. Ms Hoare,    Shauna 
• cat: Rarely, when social actors are referenced not by pronoun or by name, but 
rather through some category of occupation or role, aligning with categorising 
naming strategies (van Leeuwen [52]), e.g. mother,   killer 
 
Mark-up of gender: 
• f: Direct, individual references to female   offenders 
• Example: That morning, \actor gender = ‘‘f’’ case = ‘‘nom’’ name = 
‘‘giv’’[ Hannah Bonser \/actor[ had purchased two kitchen kni- ves at 
Boyes Store in Doncaster. 
• m: References to male defendants, either singular or multiple co-offenders (all 
male) 
• fm: References to female and male co-offenders in a single naming strategy 
• fv: References to a female offender and a (female) victim in a single naming 
strategy; a very rare type (occurring 10 times total), mostly limited to the 
Philpott case (accounting for 9  instances). 
Incorporating XML mark-up allows us to instantaneously search for naming 
strategies, cross-tabulated by gender (see Table 2 for frequencies) or naming 
convention (discussed in Sect. 3). This, in turn, affords greater flexibility in the 
application of frequency and concordance  analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 A critical evaluation of the grammatical ‘case’ of WWK forms the basis of our follow-up paper, 
currently in preparation. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2   Frequency of all naming strategies by   gender 
 
Gender of referent F M FM FV Total 
Frequency 1810 1195 431 10 3446 
 
 
3 Analysis of Naming Strategies 
 
In the sections below, we detail all naming strategies for WWK in our corpus of 
sentencing remarks. For ease of discussion, the naming strategies are grouped under 
three categories: Pronominal (e.g. you, she), Nominative (e.g. Joanne Dennehy, Mrs 
Kunene), and Categorising (e.g. killer, mother). An overview of the usage of naming 
strategies falling under these categories, cross-tabulated by gender of offender and 
depicted by raw count and percentage of total references, can be found in Table 3 
below. 
The analysis is structured in such a way that the most frequent strategies (both by 
category and subcategory) are discussed first, with subsequent categories and 
subcategories appearing in order of descending frequency. As such, see Sect. 3.1 for 
Pronouns, Sect. 3.2 for Nomination, and Sect. 3.3 for Categorising naming 
strategies. 
 
 
Table 3 Overview of reference category usage for female and male offenders, with raw frequency and 
percentage of overall naming  strategies 
 
Reference 
category 
Frequency (female 
offenders) 
Frequency (male co- 
offenders) 
Log likelihood (female 
to male) 
Pronominal 1537 (84.9%) 921 (77.1%) ?5.45 
Nominative 232 (12.8%) 239 (20.0%) -23.16 
Categorising 39 (2.2%) 35 (2.9%) -1.72 
  
 
Table 4   Type, tokens, and frequencies of all pronominal   references 
 
Reference type Reference tokens (frequency) Frequency (% overall) 
Second-person pronoun you (854), your (426), yourself (26), yours (2), u   (1) 1309 (72.3%) 
Third-person pronoun she (132), her (84), hers (1), herself  (1) 218 (12.0%) 
First-person pronoun I (9), my (1) 10 (0.6%) 
 
 
 
3.1 Pronominal References 
 
The most frequent method of referring to offenders across the sentencing remarks in 
our corpus is through pronouns (see Table 4 for indicative tokens and frequencies). 
English does not follow the T versus V form of other European languages, and thou 
and thee have fallen out of common usage, leading Hook to claim that ‘‘the 
reduction to a single form, you (sg. and pl.), means that, in modern standard English, 
the semantics of solidarity and power now lie elsewhere than the realm of pronoun 
usage’’ [25: 183]. However, as noted earlier, we consider each linguistic form to be 
a choice (conscious or not) on the part of the    judge. 
In this section, we analyse different patterns emerging in pronominal use, from 
most to least frequent (second-person, third-person, first-person). We make note of 
both majority/expected patterns (particularly in second-person pronoun usage) but 
also raise issues to do with minority/unexpected patterns (see our discussion on first- 
person pronouns, below). 
 
3.1.1 Second-Person Pronouns 
 
Within the sentencing remarks, the most frequent pronominal naming strategy (and 
indeed, the most frequent reference type overall) used by the judiciary when 
referring to the female defendants is the second-person pronoun, i.e. you. This 
constitutes 72.3% of all references to WWK within the corpus (independently of 
references to women alongside male co-offenders). This result, whilst noted in and 
of itself, was not unexpected. Indeed, judges will typically directly address the 
defendant(s) when delivering sentencing remarks, summing up the evidence, 
commenting on mitigating and/or aggravating factors, and handing down the final 
sentence. 
 
3.1.2 Third-Person Pronouns 
 
The second most frequent pronominal naming strategy is the use of third person 
pronouns, i.e. she. This is an expected pattern in English narratives and therefore we 
must be wary of over-interpretation of the high frequency of this naming strategy 
within our corpus. Once a point of reference has been established explicitly, this 
information can be reused by substituting third person pronouns, thereby making the 
discourse less repetitive while still retaining cohesion. However, unlike first and 
  
 
 
 
second person pronouns, third person pronouns and all combinations of given name 
strategies are non-deictic. This means that when using naming strategies comprised 
of third person pronouns and given names, the judiciary create narratives that can be 
accessible not only to those sharing the same deixis but also to those who are not, 
i.e. people outside of the courtroom who are unrelated to the case, including 
journalists and members of the public. This is expected in relation to this set of 
sentencing remarks due to the high-profile nature of the cases. Indeed, it is likely 
that the judges involved knew that the sentencing remarks would be publicised 
beforehand and that they may have been influenced by this and so taken great care 
to create narratives cohesive to a range of   audiences. 
Whilst second and third person pronouns as pronominal naming strategies within 
the sentencing remarks are expected, the usage of first person pronouns is marked 
and discursively interesting. 
 
3.1.3 First-Person Pronouns 
 
In contrast to the significant usage of the second-person and third-person pronouns 
is the low frequency of first-person pronoun usage,
6 
i.e. I. Amongst the pronominal 
naming strategies, first-person pronouns are dramatically and markedly less frequent 
than other types. Only ten instances fall into this category, constituting 0.6% of total 
references to the women within our corpus. This may be explicable simply by 
reference to the nature of sentencing remarks, where the judge is directly addressing 
the defendant(s) and their actions, as well as recounting case facts. Indeed, this 
genre is typified by talking to and about defendants, re-framing and re-formulating 
their statements via indirect quotation; reflecting the judge’s role as narrator. 
However, as Rackley [47: 53] argues, judges also act as persuaders through their 
story-telling, helping to create ‘‘a truth universally acknowledged.’’ Therefore, it is 
‘‘the way in which the judge tells the story, alongside the form and language of their 
opinion …’’ [47: 46] that is important. We suggest that one consequence of an 
approach which largely rejects first person pronoun use is silencing of the voices 
and perspectives of ‘others’, i.e. offenders; in our case: female    defendants. 
The silencing of women’s voices, especially those of female criminals, is well 
recognised within feminist legal and criminological scholarship (see, for example; 
[4, 5]). Silencing is evident in the sentencing remarks analysed, with the ten 
instances of first person pronoun usage being confined to just three of the 17 cases 
that we analysed (Dennehy, Edgington, and Hoare). Where first-person pronoun 
usage appears, it is through direct quotation from the female defendants themselves. 
However, the way in which this direct quotation is utilised varies markedly across 
the three cases, with different impacts on identity construction for the women 
involved. Therefore, it is to an analysis of these three cases that we now turn. 
First-person pronoun usage is most frequent in the case of Joanne Dennehy, with 
eight instances. Dennehy pled guilty to the murders of three men and the  attempted 
 
6 Compared to third person pronouns, first person pronouns have a log likelihood value of -1710.96. 
Compared to second person pronouns, first person pronouns have a log likelihood value of -235.28. This 
represents significant underuse, with p values well below  0.0001. 
  
 
murder of two others, as well as three offences of preventing the lawful burial of her 
victims’ bodies. In reviewing first-person pronouns in this case, it becomes apparent 
that Dennehy is not silenced and that her voice is indeed heard, at least to some 
extent. What is interesting is the way in which her voice is heard and the context 
within which it is used by the judge. Further analysis of the concordance lines 
demonstrates that Dennehy’s voice is solely incorporated to strengthen the judge’s 
narrative. Indeed, her voice is appropriated by the judge to reinforce his construction 
of her identity as a ‘‘bad’’ woman whose actions could not be reconciled within 
understandings both of femininity and of  humanity. 
1. I note that you told the psychiatrist that you killed to see how you would feel, 
‘‘to see if I was as cold as I thought I was. Then it got moreish and I got a taste 
for it.’’ [Dennehy] 
 
Although Dennehy’s voice is heard, it is in such a way that she further highlights 
the extreme deviance others perceive that she has exhibited. This is further 
reinforced by the fact that although Dennehy was diagnosed with numerous 
psychiatric and personality disorders, the judge did not afford her any mitigation 
[43: 17], and the narrative focus remained on the extreme deviance and depravity of 
her actions: 
2. The only reason you can offer for the attempted murders is ‘‘drunken cruelty 
plain and simple, compelled by my lack of respect for human life’’. As I have 
already made clear, I reject your protestations of remorse for these attempted 
murders. [Dennehy] 
 
First-person pronoun usage also features in Nicola Edgington’s sentencing 
remarks. Edgington was found guilty of the murder of Sally Hodkin and attempted 
murder of Kerry Clark. She left a closed psychiatric unit where she had asked to be 
seen after indicating that she was dangerous and having a breakdown. She then stole 
a knife from a butcher’s shop and used it to attack Hodkin and Clark. The first- 
person pronoun only appears twice in her sentencing remarks, both in the same 
sentence, and both in relation to Edgington’s experience of being ignored by health 
care professionals when attempting to describe her deteriorating mental health prior 
to the attacks: 
3. You said later that ‘they were just tapping keyboards, I told them I was going   
to hurt someone, this all their fault.’   [Edgington] 
 
Whilst this may simply be verbatim of accepted evidence, it appears, prima facie, 
that her perspective is therefore being included by the judge. Her voice is clearly not 
being directly silenced in the way that other women are where first-person pronoun 
use is excluded, and it is arguably not appropriated and re-narrativised in the same 
way that Dennehy’s is. Rather, we suggest that what is occurring is a subtler form of 
indirect or hidden silencing. This can be illustrated by drawing upon Ballinger’s [4] 
and Barlow’s [5] work on the silencing of offending women. They note that 
potential for the development of new subject positions for female offenders can   be 
  
 
 
 
closed by legal discourse, for example by only partially presenting their 
perspectives, i.e. ‘hidden’ silencing or ‘muting’ of the   voice. 
The final case where first-person pronouns appear is that of Shauna Hoare. Hoare 
was convicted of the manslaughter of 16-year-old Becky Watts, the step-sister of  
her co-offender, Nathan Matthews (who was found guilty of murder). Hoare was 
also found guilty of conspiracy to kidnap Becky, perverting the course of justice, 
preventing the unlawful burial of Becky and the possession of two stun guns. The 
first-person pronoun usage here appears in a different context. Whereas in Dennehy 
and Edgington, first person pronoun usage features in relation to oral testimony 
given by the two women, in Hoare, it constitutes part of written evidence in the 
form of a text message sent by Hoare to   Matthews: 
4.  He [Nathan Matthews] had started exchanging text messages with Shauna 
Hoare in which they had discussed kidnapping pretty teenage school girls for 
sex (‘‘fuck u bring me bk 2 pretty school girls’’ and ‘‘lol yhh i ll just kidnap  
them from school’’). […] The false suggestion given by both of them during 
trial, namely that these texts were just banter or pandering to tastes, shows how 
much their understanding of where proper boundaries of conduct began and 
ended had become corrupted and warped.  [Hoare] 
 
Whilst again this may be an example of the judge repeating evidence verbatim, 
the way in which it is used and the narrative built around it helps to construct a 
picture of the co-defendants’ relationship. By preceding the text message from 
Hoare with that sent by Matthews which is both abusive (‘‘fuck u’’), and includes a 
degrading command (‘‘bring me bk 2 pretty school girls’’), the power imbalance 
between the two defendants is highlighted. This is reinforced later in the remarks 
where the judge explicitly notes that Hoare’s ‘‘involvement in these offences was 
very much a product of the nature of the relationship with Nathan Matthews’’ [46: 
para 29]. However, it is clear the judge is attaching significant culpability to Hoare 
for her involvement in the crimes by highlighting deviance from ‘‘proper boundaries 
of conduct’’ [46: para 15]. Therefore, the inclusion of Hoare’s voice serves to both 
position her within a recognisably ‘feminine’ role (subservient to a male partner), 
while simultaneously contributing to a narrative of deviance and    ‘othering’. 
Interestingly, even where first person pronoun use is indicative of the inclusion of 
WWK’s own voices, it is extremely rarely indicative of the inclusion of WWK’s 
own narratives. As such, the power of these women’s perspectives is diminished or 
denied, and they remain in the traditionally feminine position of passivity and 
silence. 
 
3.2 Nomination 
 
Whilst the use of pronouns is far more frequent than other naming strategies, our 
analysis also highlights that WWK are referred to (or nominated) by several 
combinations of given names in sentencing remarks. As noted in the preceding 
analysis, in and of itself this fact is unsurprising due to the non-deictic nature of 
these naming strategies. However, as our subsequent analysis will demonstrate,  the 
  
 
Table 5   Solidarity and power in naming strategies. Adapted from [27:    184] 
 
G
re
a
te
r so
lid
arity
 
(w
h
e
n
 re
c
ip
ro
c
a
l) 
1. Title 
G
re
a
te
r 
p
o
w
e
r 
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4. Last name only 
5. First name only 
6. Names of endearment 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6   Type, tokens, and frequencies of all given name    references 
Reference type Reference tokens (frequency) Frequency 
(% overall) 
 
Forename ? surname Joanne Dennehy (62), Shauna Hoare (29), Hannah Bonser (21), 
Rebecca Shuttleworth (13), Donna Chalk (12), Susan Edwards 
(12), Mairead Philpott (11), Magdelena Luczak (8),  Amanda 
Hutton (6), Anna Lagwinowicz (3), Farzana Ahmed (3),   Fiaz 
Munshi (2), Tania Clarence  (1) 
183 (10.1%) 
Title ? surname Mrs Kunene (15), Ms Hoare (9) 24 (1.3%) 
Surname Lagwinowicz (21) 21 (1.2%) 
Forename Mairead (3), Rebecca (1) 4 (0.2%) 
 
power and solidarity relationships intimated by certain naming strategies provide 
some interesting and novel insights into the gendered identity constructions of the 
female defendants under  consideration. 
Leech [29: 110–111] provides a list of potential semantic categories of 
nomination, in order from most intimate to most   distant: 
1. Endearments: e.g. darling 
2. Family terms: e.g. mummy 
3. Familiarisers: e.g. mate 
4. Familiarised first names: e.g.  Becky 
5. First names in full: e.g.  Rebecca 
6. Title and surname: e.g. Mrs  Johns 
7. Honorifics: e.g. Madam 
 
Choice of name serves an important social-marking function that speakers of 
European languages may recognise with the T versus V pronouns. For instance, 
first-name address indicates a sense of equality of  common  closeness, whereas  
title ? surname marks distant, respectful relationships between interlocutors [32: 
154]. So, in addition to social proximity, power may also be embedded in naming 
strategies. Hook [25] provides a ranking (adapted in Table 5) to suggest the 
hierarchy of naming in  English. 
In this section, we analyse the use of given name strategies to consider the role 
that these play in constructing identities, particularly gendered ones, for WWK. 
  
 
 
 
Given name strategies comprise approximately 13% of all references to this class of 
social actors in the corpus of sentencing remarks; in Table 6, we provide an 
overview of reference tokens and  frequencies. 
As in Sect. 3.1, our discussion progresses from the most frequent naming strategy 
(forename ? surname) to the most uncommon naming strategy (forename only). 
Illustrative examples from the data and additional information from the cases appear 
within the discussion to support our  analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Forename ? Surname 
 
The preferred given name usage is clearly forename ? surname, with a frequency  
of 183, and the majority of WWK (13 out of 17) appearing in the corpus in this 
manner (see Table 6). On the cline of formality/solidarity, forename ? surname is 
neutrally positioned. Even unconsciously, this may account for the overwhelming 
preference of judges for this naming strategy. The forename ? surname strategy is 
explicit in its reference, often appears in the vocative case (e.g. in sentencing 
remarks containing more than one offender, where it is frequently used), and does 
not obviously make any attempt at distancing or   solidarity. 
Notably, for the majority of WWK (Dennehy, Bonser, Chalk, Edwards, Luczak, 
Hutton, Ahmed, Munshi, and Clarence), forename ? surname is the only given name 
strategy assigned to them. An explanation for this may be that it is a stylistic 
preference of the judges handing down the sentences, or that it reflects an approach 
proposed during their judicial training. There may be another possible explanation, 
though. The majority of these women (Dennehy, Bonser, Chalk, Edwards, Luczak, 
and Ahmed) were found guilty of murder (rather than another ‘lesser’ homicide 
offence). Further, whilst Hutton was not convicted of murder but unlawful act 
manslaughter, the judge explicitly noted in sentencing that the case had ‘‘to be 
regarded as a bad a case of unlawful killing of a child by a parent as it is possible to 
imagine’’ [44: 5]. Moreover, whilst Munshi and Clarence were also not convicted of 
murder but unlawful killing and manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility 
respectively, both of these women killed multiple children. Therefore, the formality of 
referring to these women by forename ? surname may reflect the seriousness of their 
offences. We revisit other naming strategies which may key severity below. 
 
3.2.2 Title ? Surname 
 
Only two sentencing remarks in our corpus include the use of title ? surname as a 
nomination strategy: Mrs Kunene (14) and Ms Hoare (9). As noted in Table 6 
above, Hoare is most frequently nominated as forename ? surname (29 instances), 
but has nine instances of title ? surname. The mixed nomination strategies in this 
case are, we believe, most likely a reflection of the judge’s sentencing style and thus 
we have decided to exclude consideration of the title ? surname nominations here 
as we are wary of over-interpretation. However, the use of title ? surname in the 
case of Kunene is marked and thus discursively interesting. Indeed, in this case all 
given name references to Virginia Kunene (and her husband Nkosiyapha Kunene) 
  
 
are in the form of title ? surname. This is the only case in which this occurs and 
thus further consideration will be given to this   below. 
Kunene was married, and she and her husband were the parents of Ndingeko 
Kunene, who died less than 6 months after birth from florid rickets resulting from a 
severe vitamin D deficiency. Ndingeko Kunene had medical problems and fluctuating 
health from birth, but because of religious beliefs as strict Seventh Day Adventists, 
Virginia Kunene (and her husband) did not seek medical assistance when he became 
unwell. Therefore, on the day he died, although realising that he was very unwell and 
at risk of death, Kunene continued not to seek medical assistance. She pled guilty to 
gross negligence manslaughter ‘‘only on the basis of the omission to call for medical 
attention’’ [45: 4]. (Her husband also pled guilty to gross negligence manslaughter). 
There are two potential reasons we suggest for the sole use of title ? surname 
nomination in this case. The first is that this is simply the judge’s stylistic preference; 
indeed, the fact that the judge uses the same nomination for the male offender in this 
case could well support this (see concordance line 5 below). Therefore, we are 
continually on guard for over-interpretation. However, in viewing concordance lines 
where Mrs Kunene appears, a second possibility occurs: that Kunene’s actions are 
perceived as capable of recuperation within understandings of ‘appropriate feminin- 
ity’, particularly centred around passivity, good character, and membership of a 
(dedicated) heterosexual marriage. Indeed, the good character of Kunene, as well as 
her (heterosexual) marital status and ‘dedication’ to her relationship indicated therein, 
are all explicitly noted as mitigating features in the case: 
5. It is accepted on all sides that the following are mitigating features: (1) The 
good character of each Defendant. Mr Kunene is now 36 years of age and Mrs 
Kunene is 32. They are a dedicated and humble couple. [Kunene] 
 
Whilst previous good character is recognised as a mitigating factor within 
sentencing guidelines when considering the seriousness of the offence [51], it is 
once again the way in which this is presented by the judge that we are concerned 
with. The context provided around her son’s death focuses upon her submission and 
deference to her husband, whose religious views were ‘‘very extreme’’ [45: 2–3]. It 
was also explicitly noted that Kunene did wish to seek medical attention for her son 
but was advised by her husband ‘‘that it would be a sin in the eyes of God to call for 
medical assistance as he had made a vow that he would await guidance from God 
before doing so’’ [45: 4]. Her ‘‘religious convictions were a significant factor in 
deference to her husband’s view … and her omission to call for medical attention’’ 
[45: 4]. A focus on this context helps to construct Kunene as a woman who can be 
rehabilitated within patriarchal understandings of femininity, which require women 
to be passive, non-aggressive, and often defer to the view of their husbands. This is 
further reinforced by the fact that her actions in relation to her son’s death were 
peculiarly feminine; Kunene did not actively kill her son through aggressive means, 
but acted passively in failing to get medical attention for him, resulting in his death. 
Thus, whilst she transgressed understandings of femininity by being involved in the 
death of her son, her passivity in this, and her seeming adherence to patriarchal 
constructions of femininity in every other aspect of her life, meant that she could be 
  
 
 
 
‘‘represented as more recognisably feminine’’ [50: 8]. As such, we suggest that the 
sole use of title ? surname nomination in this case reflects a degree of ‘respect’ and 
distance being accorded to her by the judge, perhaps because of her adherence 
otherwise to expectations of women within appropriate   femininity. 
 
3.2.3 Surname Only 
 
The only WWK in the corpus to be referred to by surname only is Lagwinowicz 
(freq. 19). Anna Lagwinowicz, alongside her ex-boyfriend and another male 
defendant, killed her boyfriend’s current partner in order to claim her life insurance 
policy. The murder was premeditated, with Lagwinowicz contacting her ex-boyfriend 
on hundreds of occasions to plan, as well as put together a trail of false evidence. Once 
they had conducted the murder, they disposed of the body. It must be noted that the 
judge in this case refers to all of the defendants (two men and one woman) by surname 
only, save for two vocative instances of forename ? surname. This is in contrast to 
nomination of the victim, who is most often referred to as forename only: 
6. On Catherine’s graduation day in 2011, Lagwinowicz sent a text to Catherine, 
telling her Nowak was in her bed, as he was, though he claimed he had been 
lured there by Lagwinowicz and drugged.   [Lagwinowicz] 
 
Again, while we are wary of over interpreting the stylistic preference of a particular 
judge, we note that this combination of nomination distances listeners/readers from the 
defendants while creating a sense of social proximity to the victim. By creating greater 
solidarity with—and humanisation of—the victim, the judge reinforces the heinous 
nature of the crime that took place. Moreover, the use of surname only indicates 
decreased power encoded into the text [25] and has the additional effect of obscuring the 
gender of the actor. Without the inclusion of the recognisable feminine forename Anna 
or of a gendered title (which would additionally imbue power), the social actor 
Lagwinowicz is discursively stripped of gender. This is an interesting approach to take, 
not least because gender can be so central to an individual’s identity. Thus, by removing 
references to her gender through a surname only naming strategy, the heinousness of 
Lagwinowicz’s actions are centralised and there is no attempt to explain or justify her 
actions in relation to her identity as a woman. Indeed, whilst Lagwinowicz is referred to 
as ‘girlfriend’ once within the sentencing remarks, this is an identifying naming strategy 
in the context of her within a heterosexual relationship (see Sect. 3.3.1 below), rather 
than a focus on her gender. In this way, the challenge that her actions could pose to 
patriarchal constructions of appropriate femininity is nullified through a discursive 
construction of her as genderless and thus a non-woman [53, 54]. 
 
 
3.2.4 Forename Only 
 
Forename only is the least frequent nomination in the corpus. Only two female 
defendants are referred to by forename only: Mairead [Philpott] (3) and Rebecca 
[Shuttleworth] (1). 
  
 
Philpott was convicted of the manslaughter of six of her children. With her 
husband and another male friend she set fire to their house whilst her children slept 
upstairs in an effort to frame her husband’s ex-partner and to remove her children 
from her care. When Philpott is referred to by forename only it appears that this is to 
illustrate her subordinate position in the family, particularly in relation to her 
husband. 
7. Apparently you expected Mairead to remain in the house with the children just 
as before. [Philpott] 
8. You then met Lisa Willis as I have described. Mairead agreed to have her in   
the house. She told the court she was hurt. Of course she was. You did not care. 
You controlled and manipulated those women…  [Philpott] 
9.  You made sure that Mairead ’’stuck to the story’’. Checking with her at every 
opportunity that she wasn’t going to stray, as you put it. [Philpott] 
 
Therefore, these instances of referring to Philpott by forename only may be an 
attempt by the judge to acknowledge the context within which she acted in 
participating in the death of her children, and to do so in a way that demonstrates some 
compassion or understanding. This indicates her dual role as offender (killer of her 
children) and victim (of her co-offender husband). Indeed, within our corpus, (as has 
been noted in preceding analysis), it is the female defendant’s victims who are 
typically referred to by forename only. This naming strategy used in this way clearly 
constructs offenders as powerless [25] and with a high level of solidarity [29]. 
A different use of forename as a naming strategy is taken in the case of 
Shuttleworth. She was convicted of murdering her young son, Keanu, after seriously 
assaulting him and subsequently failing to arrange appropriate medical attention to 
treat his life-threatening injuries. In the sentencing remark, she is far more 
frequently referred to by forename surname, and only one instance of forename only 
appears: 
10. But as you [Luke Southerton] told your friend Wayne Collins, Rebecca and 
 Keanu came as a package.  [Shuttleworth] 
 
This may be another example of the judge repeating accepted evidence verbatim, 
with the use of forename only here being an indirect quote in her partner’s (Luke 
Southerton’s) intimate voice [29]. By using this quote it reflects how Luke would 
refer to her: with high solidarity and low power imbalance. It is also possible that 
the singular occurrence of forename only may be for greater symmetry with 
‘‘Keanu’’ (her son and victim) as they are being discussed as part of a family unit. 
 
 
3.3 Categorising  Naming Strategies 
 
The main subject of this paper so far has been nomination, or reference to social 
actors’ unique identities in discourse. According to van Leeuwen [52: 42–45], social 
actors may also be categorised, or represented according to what they do or who 
they are. There are three forms of   categorisation: 
  
 
 
 
Table 7   Frequency of identifying, functionalising, appraising and differentiating naming   strategies 
Reference 
category 
Subcategory Reference tokens (frequency) Freq. 
 
 
Identification Relational mother (10), parent (5), wife (4), girlfriend  (3), Keanu’s 23 
mother (1) 
Classification    woman (3), very young woman (1), girls (1), mad woman (1) 6 
Physical – 
Functionalisation killer (1), group of killers (1), serial killer   (1), triple 6 
murderer (1), suspect (1), defendant  (1) 
Appraisement monster (2), skivvy (1),  slave (1) 4 
Differentiation anyone (1), any normal parent (1), individual   in decent 3 
society (1) 
 
 
• Identification 
• Classification: representation based on membership of certain major social 
categories such as gender, age, wealth, e.g.   teenager 
• Relational identification: representation based on relationships, such as 
personal, kinship, or work relations, e.g.  mother 
• Physical identification: representation based on physical characteristics,  e.g. 
blonde 
• Functionalisation: references in terms of an activity, such as a role or 
occupation, e.g. killer 
• Appraisement: interpersonal terms, whereby social actors are ‘‘referred to in 
terms which evaluate them as good or bad, loved or hated, admired or pitied’’ 
(van Leeuwen [52:45]). 
 
The final group of naming strategies under discussion deals with these 
‘categorising’ naming strategies: identifying (reference through social category 
membership, relationships, or physical characteristics), functionalising (reference   
to offenders in terms of an activity, role,  or  occupation),  and  appraising  
(reference through explicitly evaluative terms). As we have read through and 
manually marked-up the corpus, we have had the opportunity to  identify  
additional, auxiliary methods of identity construction through differentiation, or 
differentiating individual social actors from similar actors or groups, creating a 
difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (van Leeuwen [52:  40]).  We  will  discuss 
three instances of differentiation, where women are referred to by what they are  
not. Frequency counts and  reference  tokens under  these categories can  be found 
in  Table 7 above. 
 
3.3.1 Identifying Naming Strategies 
 
A number of interesting traces of ideological positioning are evident when analysing 
the most frequent pattern: Identification. These fall under two populated subtypes 
  
 
(Relational and Classification) and one unpopulated subtype (Physical). All 
subcategories are discussed below. 
 
Identification: Relational 
This subcategory is populated with relational naming strategies such as mother 
(frequency: 10), parent (5), wife (4), and girlfriend (3). From this, it is clear that in 
the cases analysed, WWK are commonly categorised and identified through their 
position within the family; this keys socio-cultural understandings of ‘appropriate 
femininity’ within the boundaries of the mother/parent or wife/girlfriend   tropes. 
Of the Relational Identification strategies, those associated with motherhood 
(mother, parent) appear most frequently. This is likely because seven of the cases 
we analysed involved women killing their children (see Table 1). Within sentencing 
remarks, one would expect to see the judge refer to the roles and relationships 
between the offender(s) and victim(s), especially if ‘‘these roles and identities were 
of primary relevance to the killing’’ [50: 209]. This is evident in all the sentencing 
remarks where victims were known to their killers, not only those involving filicide. 
It is apparent in some of the remarks that the context within which these Relational 
naming strategies are used highlights these women’s extreme deviance from 
‘acceptable’ performances of mothering, i.e. those outlined within the so- called 
‘motherhood mandate’. The mandate reflects the societal definition of ‘‘women as 
caretakers of children’’ [48: 102], requiring women not only to want children, but 
when they have them, to subordinate their own personal needs and desires for those 
of their child(ren) [48: 102]. In the case of Hutton, the judge used the relational 
identifying parent to highlight some of the expectations associated 
with motherhood; 
11. Your use of alcohol over the years gives a real insight into you as a parent. 
Namely […] that you placed your own selfish addiction to drink well before 
your responsibilities to your many children.  [Hutton] 
 
The deviance of mothers within the sentencing remarks is further emphasised 
through juxtaposition of the ‘norm’ and the ‘deviant’ in Relational Identification. 
For instance, Clarence is ‘‘caring and patient’’ but ‘‘overwhelmed’’, ultimately 
leading to a prolonged depressive state, culminating in the killing of her children 
(line 12, below). 
12. …your GP noted that you were a caring and patient mother - albeit 
overwhelmed by the number of medical appointments that you had to attend… 
[Clarence] 
 
The dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothers is also 
evident through the use of Differentiation, for example in the case of   Shuttleworth. 
13. There was only one reason why you, Keanu’s mother, did not summon  
medical  help  or  take  him  to  hospital  that  weekend,  as any   normal  
parent would have done. It was your fear that this time the injuries inflicted 
upon him could never be explained away.   [Shuttleworth] 
  
 
 
 
 
Positioning Shuttleworth in this way forcefully condemns her behaviour through 
an explicit recognition that her fear of punishment in the criminal justice system was 
placed above the wellbeing of her child (the latter of which would have been the 
expected behaviour of ‘‘any  normal  parent’’). 
In the same vein, the ‘bad’ mother construct is reinforced by the stressing of 
Relational Identification through repetitious  constructions: 
14. His was a lingering death over many hours following a brutal assault by his 
own  mother. [Shuttleworth] 
15. What was it that brought you two—her parents, the people who had given her 
life—to the point of killing her?  [Ahmed] 
 
Once the mother–child relationship is established, the motherhood mandate of 
immediate and unwavering love and provision of care is contrasted with the 
actuality of violence and death. In this way, repetitious constructions highlight these 
women as ‘bad’ mothers; women ‘‘whose neglectful, abusive, reckless, or 
murderous behaviours … destroy[ed] [their] children’’  [3: 1019]. Thus, we can    
see that through their language choices, some of the judges maintain the figure of 
the ‘‘’bad’ or ‘unfit’ mother [which] has [long] been a powerful figure in Western 
law’’ [3: 1019]. They also maintain the dichotomy between ‘‘’good’ and ‘bad’ 
mothers [which] serves as a means of patrolling, controlling and reinforcing the 
boundaries of behaviour considered ‘appropriate’ for ALL women and mothers’’  
[35: 217]. 
Though Relational Identification is most frequently recognised through mother- 
hood, several additional naming strategies identify WWK through their romantic 
relationships with men. None of the women within our corpus were convicted in 
relation to the death of their partner and therefore it is not in this context that the 
identifiers ‘wife’ and ‘girlfriend’ emerge. Rather, when these relational identifiers 
are used, they are in the context of women who co-offended with romantic partners. 
Whilst the use of these relational naming strategies themselves is perhaps expected 
given these contexts, what is of interest is that only gendered relational identifiers 
are used (wife, girlfriend), whereas gender neutral options such as ‘spouse’ or 
‘partner’ are rejected. Moreover, the way in which these gendered terms are used 
within the sentencing remarks is noteworthy and worthy of further    exploration. 
The Relational Identification wife is particularly interesting; whilst it places the 
women squarely within a heteronormative frame of (good) social standing, this is 
also traditionally understood to be a position of subordination within a patriarchal 
society. It is this position of subordination within which wife is most frequently 
invoked by the judges in their sentencing remarks. In line 16, we see how Mrs 
Kunene’s decision making is overridden by her husband, who advises against 
medical intervention, citing religious reasons. Concordance line 17 also indicates 
the other ways in which women are disempowered within the frame of marriage— 
through physical control and violence at the hands of their    partners. 
  
 
16. Mr Kunene accepts that he advised his wife that it would be a sin in the eyes  
of God to call for medical assistance as he had made a vow that he would 
await guidance from God before doing so.   [Kunene] 
17. You subjected your wife to physical violence throughout your relationship.  
She  never   reported  anything  to  the  police.  She  was  too  afraid  to  do   
so. [Philpott] 
 
Using ‘wife’ to highlight the subordination of these women within their co- 
offending relationships emphasises their disempowerment without specifically 
labelling them as ‘victims’, which would have disempowered them completely. 
Consequently, the women can still have varying degrees of culpability attached to 
them—at the discretion of the judge—whilst simultaneously some explanation can 
be offered for their actions (i.e. involvement in a co-offending relationship with 
their husband/partner). In turn, the challenge posed by these women to understand- 
ings of ‘appropriate femininity’ is limited by recuperating their actions within the 
context of a relationship within which power still swings towards the man. Indeed, 
the gendered identities created for these women as wives reinforces the notion that 
women should be dependent on men, broadly affirming that women lack 
independence and status. 
While exploring title ? surname nomination (at 3.2.2), we discussed social 
indexing of (heteronormative) marital status as positive, with nominations encoding 
‘respect’ and distance. Above, we see that construction of WWK as wives reveals a 
more nuanced understanding of the actual functioning of relationships in a patriarchal 
society. To that end, the sentencing remarks demonstrate that the naming strategy of 
girlfriend can be doubly disempowering: girlfriends are unmarried (and therefore 
lack social status), but are still subordinates within personal relationships. In line 18, 
we see that Nowak (Lagwinowicz’s male co-offender) is described as leaving his then 
girlfriend Lagwinowicz to begin a relationship with Catherine Wells-Burr, their 
eventual victim. So, while wife (or Mrs) has the positive effect of enhanced social 
status, girlfriend lacks both status and permanence, appearing in constructions where 
women are further subordinated and more open to  abandonment.
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18.  Catherine worked on the production line at Numatics in her university 
vacation. It was there, in 2010, that she met Nowak; their relationship began, 
and he left his then girlfriend, Lagwinowicz. I suspect even then, Catherine’s 
family had their reservations. By the time of her death, Jayne, with a mother’s 
instinct certainly did.  [Lagwinowicz] 
 
Identification: Classification 
Further naming strategies of Identification include six under Classification. 
Classifying naming strategies underscore the salience of gender and age in these 
sentencing remarks; woman (3), very young    woman (1), girls (1), and mad woman 
 
7 It is noteworthy that in line 18, offenders are referred to by surname only, whereas the victim and her 
mother are referred to by first name, further underscoring our previous findings in Sect. 3.2, where ‘norm’ 
identities are constructed as socially close and feminised with first name use, whereas ‘deviant’ identities 
are distanced through surname use, with femininity  erased. 
  
 
 
 
(1) appear relatively infrequently and serve to categorise WWK more widely into 
(gendered, aged, moralistic) roles within society. While naming strategies from this 
category may seem more neutral than those listed under Functionalisation, these are 
used to evidence deviation from expected roles and feminine behaviours. In line 19, 
the judge expresses the unlikelihood that Smith would commit such a crime, given 
her gender, age, motherhood, and lack of previous   convictions: 
19. At first blush, it seemed unlikely that a woman of your age, a mother of five 
children with no previous convictions should even contemplate setting fire to a 
house let alone a house with people in it.   [Smith] 
 
These naming strategies, then, can indicate a transformation in progress. 
Participation in the legal system as a defendant is, in itself, othering, and further 
contrasts may be set up through naming strategies. WWK are described as 
previously having ‘in-group’ qualities, which then transition to ‘out-group’ qualities 
(such as lack of employment or friends) in line   20. 
20. Susan Edwards, you had worked as a very young woman but gave up your 
post in the 1980s and did not work after that. You had no friends and did not 
 enjoy meeting new people.  [Edwards] 
 
The classifying naming strategy of ‘mad’ appears in the case of Dennehy, in the 
voice of one of her  victims: 
21.  John Chapman described you to another tenant, Toni Ann  Roberts as ‘‘the  
mad  woman’’. [Dennehy] 
 
The inclusion of this term of Identification is interesting on multiple levels, not least 
because Dennehy pleaded guilty to the murders she was accused of and did not raise a 
defence such as diminished responsibility (which would invoke discourses of ‘madness’). 
Firstly, this form of Identification, whilst being extremely othering due to the associated 
stigma of mental illness [23], provides an ‘appropriately feminine’ rationale for her 
murders. That is to say, the ‘mad’ identity fits well with certain ideas about women and 
femininity, namely that ‘‘women … are determined by their biology and their physiology. 
Their hormones, their reproductive role, inexorably determine their emotionality, 
unreliability, childishness, deviousness etc. These facts lead to female crime’’ [23: 112]. 
In Dennehy, the inclusion of the folk term mad woman (in the victim’s voice) differs from 
the judge’s inclusion of psychiatrist reports, which describe Dennehy as being diagnosed 
with a ‘‘psychopathic disorder’’, ‘‘severe emotionally unstable personality disorder’’, 
‘‘antisocial personality disorder’’, and ‘‘paraphilia sadomasochism’’. These formal, 
specific, and medicalised terms reflect a range of mental disorders, the particular effects 
of which may not be readily understood by the text’s audience. Therefore, the judge takes 
a departure in including the less specific mad woman, which indexes cultural 
(mis)understandings about and taboos around mental health disorders [23]. 
Despite the inclusion of this identifying term, a second point of interest arises, 
namely that this is not the dominant naming strategy that emerges in Dennehy’s 
case. As we will discuss below (at 3.3.2), functionalising naming strategies that 
  
 
emphasise Dennehy’s extreme deviance are most frequently invoked by the judge. 
Thus, we suggest that the inclusion of the ‘mad’ classifier through the voice of one 
of her victims, alongside a detailed acknowledgment of the evidence presented by 
her psychiatrist (despite no plea of diminished responsibility), is done to 
demonstrate how Dennehy may be viewed by   others. 
 
Identification: Physical 
Physical identification (e.g. ‘beauty’) does not appear in the corpus at all. Its 
absence is noteworthy because of its usual importance; physical appearance plays a 
powerful role in cultural definitions of femininity [30: 34] and this is reflected in 
public discourse. This is particularly true for WWK, with media reporting 
emphasising these women’s appearances [16]. Whilst we have seen that discursive 
constructions of femininity are both relevant and important to the judiciary (either 
consciously or unconsciously), this particular element of femininity appears not to 
be. One obvious explanation for this is that the physical appearances of WWK have 
very little to do with the homicides they have been convicted of (contrary to what 
media discourse would suggest). Another is that commenting on and identifying 
women in relation to their physical appearance may be perceived as overtly sexist or 
gendered, and thus a conscious decision to avoid such an approach may have been 
made. Whatever the explanation, the exclusion of physical identification within the 
sentencing remarks highlights one clear difference in the way that WWK are 
constructed by the judiciary versus the   media. 
 
3.3.2 Functionalising Naming Strategies 
 
Functionalising naming strategies are found only six times in the corpus. No doubt 
largely due to our data type, these all construct WWK in terms of their ‘legal role’: 
triple murderer (1), suspect (1), serial killer (1), killer (1), group of killers (1), 
defendant (1). Arguably, this is the most expected naming strategy for WWK in 
sentencing remarks, as their most salient identity within the discourse of sentencing 
remarks is related to functionalisation of their role within the legal process. 
However, what is of interest here is that only two instances use distinctively ‘legal’ 
terminology—suspect and defendant. 
22. Then,  on  23rd  September  1997,  you  were  arrested  and  interviewed  as    
a suspect. You told the police the same lies.    [Munshi] 
23. Coming the other way on the same  path,  was  the defendant,  Hannah  
Bonser. [Bonser] 
 
The use of ‘folk’ terms such as killer appear more frequently, emphasising the 
deviance of the referents in a way that ‘legal’ terminology does not. Indeed, the use 
of killer as a Functionalising naming strategy in the cases of Osoteku and Hutton 
contributes to a compounded image of these women as particularly violent and 
odious. 
24. You joined the group of killers who set upon Sofyen Belamoudden as he lay 
helpless and defenceless upon the floor of the ticket hall, having pursued   him 
  
 
 
 
down the stairs as he fell, in the sight of those many horrified onlookers who 
had been going about their lawful business at the height, as I have said, of the 
rush hour. [Osoteku] 
25. Preventing the proper burial of Hamzah over a period of almost 2 years 
following him being starved to death by you and you being afraid to report his 
death because of your fear of being found out as his killer. [Hutton] 
 
The term killer also appears, alongside that of murderer, in the case of  Dennehy. 
However here, both terms are quantified in a way that they are not in other cases: 
26. You are a cruel, calculating, selfish, and manipulative serial killer.  [Dennehy] 
27. They did not involve any violence but they demonstrate a willingness to assist 
a  triple  murderer  to  evade  justice. [Dennehy] 
 
The quantification strategies used by the judge do not only serve the function of 
highlighting case facts, but also further emphasise Dennehy’s depravity and her 
discursive construction as a ‘bad’ woman. In line 26 we see serial killer used to 
emphasise Dennehy’s deviance, both in the context of her crime and her demeanour. 
In line 27, Dennehy is depicted as the leading actor in the murders, assuming a 
dominant role over her male co-offenders. She is regarded as the ‘mastermind’ and 
thus as a ‘‘dangerous, unsettling figure’’ [50:  40]. 
 
3.3.3 Appraising Naming Strategies 
 
Four additional instances of Appraisement complete the set of Determining naming 
strategies: slave (1), skivvy (1), and monster (2). These only appear in two cases 
within the corpus: Philpott (2) and Dennehy   (2). 
Two of the naming strategies in this group (slave and skivvy) appear in a single 
clause in the Philpott  case: 
28. I accept that he treated you as a skivvy or a slave, and you were prepared to  
put up with that. As became clear during the trial, you were prepared to go to 
any lengths, however humiliating, to keep him happy. At an early stage of the 
trial, it appeared that you were entirely downtrodden by Michael Philpott to 
the extent that it appeared that you felt you had no choice but to do whatever 
he wanted in whatever way he  wanted  in  any  aspect  of  your  lives  
together. [Philpott] 
 
The Appraising naming strategies here foreground the WWK’s interpersonal role 
and metaphorically narrativise Mairead Philpott’s complete subordination to (and 
abuse by) her husband. Attributing this ‘victim’ role to her may accurately reflect 
the state of affairs within her relationship. It also provides an opportunity for the 
judge to reconcile Mairead Philpott’s homicidal actions within ideologically 
dominant understandings of gender and, more specifically, appropriate submissive 
femininity. Thus, it is suggested that Philpott became involved in the homicide of 
her children via her relationship, acting at her husband’s behest. In this way, the 
challenge  that  her  homicidal  actions  pose  to  understandings  of        appropriate 
  
 
femininity is—at least—minimised, and—at most—nullified completely. An 
explanation (at least partial) for her homicidal actions is found in the form of her 
characterisation as a further ‘victim’ of her husband’s   actions. 
The other term of Appraisement found within the sentencing remarks is 
‘monster’, which has two instances, both from the case of Dennehy (lines 29 and   
30 below). This is the most negatively appraising naming strategy which appears. 
29.  Kevin Lee’s widow describes you as a monster who has taken and ruined   her 
 family’s lives. [Dennehy] 
30. You, Joanne Dennehy, described yourself to Kevin Lee as a monster for  what 
 you had done in the past.  [Dennehy] 
 
As can be seen from the concordance lines above, the term ‘monster’ is assigned 
to Dennehy both by others and herself. In both contexts, this naming strategy locates 
Dennehy as metaphorically acting in a role. By choosing to include statements 
where Dennehy is described as monstrous by the widow of one of her victims (line 
29), but also where she claims this identity for herself (line 30), the judge creates a 
narrative that not only de-femininises her, but very clearly de-humanises her as well. 
This dehumanisation strategy aligns with existing research in relation to WWK, 
particularly ‘bad’ homicidal women who are noted as being ‘‘demoted from woman 
to non-woman, to a monster lacking humanity’’ [54: 205]. They are vilified as an 
abomination and thus transformed into a mythic, non-human creature. Appraising 
Dennehy in this way allows the judge to preserve normative patriarchal 
understandings of appropriate femininity by failing to recognise particularly 
contemptible acts of female violence as able to be enacted by a human, let alone by 
a woman. Indeed, by constructing Dennehy as an ‘‘inhuman personification of 
wickedness…the radical implications of her acts are muffled …at least as far as the 
dominant purveyors of cultural meaning are concerned. She is returned to her place 
of passivity and silence’’ [36:  170]. 
 
 
4  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this analysis, we have exposed a number of interesting naming strategies for 
WWK, as well as making strides in both linguistic and legal analyses of such cases. 
As a result of this study, we have come to a number of practical recommendations 
for the judiciary when writing sentencing remarks. These appear below, following 
summaries of pertinent findings. 
Before considering these recommendations fully, it is important to note that 
whilst our findings suggest that judicial narratives within sentencing remarks should 
incorporate a minimalist and neutral description of the facts, we recognise the 
complex interpretive and ethical dimensions of judicial narrative writing, with 
competing arguments existing for both ‘interpretative’ and ‘blank’ narrative 
approaches [2]. Indeed, in relation to interpretative narratives, it is arguable that a 
richer and denser description of facts is beneficial for providing readers with an 
enriched  understanding  of  the  case.  We  suggest  that  the  strength  of  such    an 
  
 
 
 
interpretive approach, incorporating in-depth and often personal narratives, can be 
seen where multiple judges are presenting judgments on a case. As Almog [2: 499] 
notes, ‘‘together, these narratives create the ‘marketplace of stories’. Exposure to 
these competing judicial stories makes it possible to read the judgment in its full 
context, and thus form a better assessment of it’’. However, where only one judge is 
delivering remarks—as is the case with sentencing remarks—it may not be possible 
to easily discern the value judgments of the author, with the consequence that these 
also form part of the ‘facts’ of the case for some readers. This is particularly relevant 
in relation to publicly available sentencing remarks, where members of the public 
may ‘‘make up their minds or even change their minds as a result of reading a 
judgment, and will do by reason of the … narrative power of the judgment’’ [2: 
495]. As such, and whilst recognising that ‘‘even the choice of a highly limited … 
narrative … is, as a matter of fact, interpretive as well as manipulative’’ [2: 496–
497], we believe that the recommendations outlined below would positively impact 
judicial linguistic and narrative choices when writing sentencing    remarks. 
Pronominal references were (by far) the most common in the corpus. Whereas 
English does not have a T versus V system where power and solidarity may be 
clearly encoded in pronoun usage, we did find that the proportions of pronouns used 
was telling. The second-person pronoun was extremely frequent, reflecting both the 
genre of the corpus and the power flow inscribed in this type of text: the judge talks 
directly at the offender(s) and makes comments and justifications followed by a final 
sentence. The use of third-person pronouns can be explained by cohesion patterns in 
the English language, but also indicates that some consideration may have been 
taken regarding the ‘portability’ of the final text, from the court room to the media 
and wider public who are outside of the immediate social deixis. First-person 
pronouns were exceedingly uncommon, meaning that women’s own narratives were 
almost never reflected in the discursive artefact, and that their voices were silenced 
or muted. Nowhere, it seems, were women’s narratives of their own lived 
experiences acknowledged and accepted as voices in their own   right. 
Recommendation 1: Women’s narratives should be directly incorporated into 
sentencing remarks, in their own words, to allow representation of their lived 
experiences. 
Nomination strategies also showed a clear preference in use; forename ? sur- 
name was particularly favoured. The frequency of this strategy, in combination with 
its appearance in a range of grammatical positions, marks it as appropriately distant 
and the least overtly loaded with power imbalance. By contrast, title ? surname  
was seen to key either social standing (when indicating heteronormative marital 
status) or the lack thereof (when indicating lack of marital status or a young age). 
Surname only nomination removed traces of gender identity from the referent, 
whereas forename only removed social distance and was most often used for 
victims. When applied to female offenders, forename only indicated subordination 
and potential victimhood (i.e. at the hands of their intimate male partners). 
Recommendation 2: Given the implicit power/solidarity differences in 
nomination  strategies,  we  recommend  that  judges  should  consider moving 
  
 
towards standard usage of the most common and least marked form: forename 
? surname. This would bring the judiciary more in line with the overall 
reduction in title usage and remove social marking associated with titles (i.e. 
Miss, Mrs), which are experienced by female offenders, but not male 
offenders. 
During our analysis of naming strategies of Identification, we discovered that 
women who kill are often presented in firm relief against ‘norm’ identities 
associated with ‘appropriate femininity’. They do not behave as mothers ‘should’ 
and as girlfriends, they are abandoned. For the women who were wives, adherence 
to ‘appropriate femininity’ was clearer where they were passive and deferred to their 
husbands’ views, but this often resulted in them being manipulated and abused. 
Other identifying features contribute to construction of deviance: women who kill 
were described as mentally unwell and unable to contribute to society (i.e. through 
work and other duties). 
Within all the sentencing remarks, naming strategies of Functionalisation and 
Appraisement used for the women were never positive. Homicidal women were 
never recognised as functionalised members of society. They were not recognised as 
students, carers, or career women. Rather, the women were recognised as 
functioning with the parameters of their legal roles or appraised as taking up 
particularly gendered metaphorical occupations, where they were recognised in 
dichotomy as degraded victims or dehumanised monsters. We understand that some 
of these naming strategies (i.e. monster) are likely to be examples of the judges 
verbatim accepting evidence presented during the trials. Whilst accepting this, and 
indeed drawing attention throughout this article to extracts where this may be the 
case, we were ultimately interested in how the judges accepted this evidence and 
presented it within their sentencing  remarks. 
Recommendation 3: Judges should consider the impact of identifying and 
functionalising WWK in their sentencing  remarks. 
From a corpus linguistic perspective, XML mark-up has proven invaluable in 
allowing us to nearly instantaneously view, sort, and quantify patterns of naming in 
the corpus. By allowing the computer programme to ‘see’ features that are linked 
semantically or pragmatically, we have increased the frequency of items of interest 
and gone quite some way to counteract the limitations of using a small, specialised 
corpus. Rather than searching for single words, lemmata, or fixed strings, we search 
for groups of reference types. The process of manual mark-up—though somewhat 
time-consuming—was, in and of itself, extremely rewarding. In corpus linguistics, it 
is not uncommon to work with corpora of many millions (or indeed, many billions) 
of words, scraped or otherwise computationally collected. However, in these cases, 
what is saved in manual compilation is often lost in familiarity. By reading each 
case multiple times, we were able to identify not only obvious references (pronouns, 
most combinations of nomination), but also all Categorisation strategies, as well as 
instances where the identities of women who kill were constructed through 
Differentiation from ‘norm’  behaviours. 
  
 
 
 
We were also able to address one major limitation of corpus linguistic methods, 
in that it is difficult to identify and describe absences or infrequencies in data. By 
compiling all naming strategies, we identified infrequencies (notably, of first-person 
pronouns and physical identification) and associated absences (of the WWK’s own 
voices in legal narratives, linked to muting). The methodology used in this research 
is one that could be used to examine other areas of law, particularly the legal 
system’s engagement with and construction of women and other ‘deviant’ social 
actors. In this way, the full range of naming strategies (both used and disused) and 
opportunities for voicing (both realised and muted) might be quantified and 
critically analysed. 
However, studies following on in this vein may soon run into the same issue that 
we have discovered around data availability. At the time being, sentencing remarks 
are published based on perceived ‘public interest’, but this is subjective, and does a 
disservice to individual members of the public who may have their own interest in 
cases, which are, in any event, matters of public record. Sentencing remarks are 
routinely removed from the Tribunal and Judiciary’s website, and dates for data 
expiry are not openly communicated. By way of illustration: less than 20% of the 
sentencing remarks of cases relevant for our study are accessible. This raises the 
issue of whether more sentencing remarks should be made publicly and perpetually 
available (subject to the usual caveats of excluding vulnerable victims or offenders 
and taboo crimes). 
Recommendation 4: Publishing of sentencing remarks should be the rule, 
rather than the  exception. 
From a legal research perspective, the use of corpus linguistic tools has allowed 
us to triangulate, using quantitative evidence to complement and further some of the 
theoretical work that has already been undertaken in relation to WWK. For 
example, we have been able to provide, for the first time, frequency analysis in 
relation to naming strategies of Categorisation, which has formed the basis of much 
of the existing work in this area (see, for example; [10, 50, 53]). We have also 
expanded on this work, considering a greater range of potential meanings (i.e. 
pronominal use and nomination), drawing more explicitly on frameworks more 
normally associated with linguistics. Analysing sentencing remarks with interdis- 
ciplinary, empirical approaches has highlighted the extent to which the judiciary 
continue to enforce and re-inscribe understandings around ‘appropriate femininity’ 
in relation to WWK. Ultimately, the consequence of contact with a patriarchal 
judicial system is that gendered understandings of women and femininity are 
repeatedly affirmed. This is not only damaging for the WWK themselves, but for all 
women, particularly those that come into contact with the criminal justice system. 
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